How do people cope? How do different people cope differently with the biopolitical projects of state? These questions are the subject of this paper. I will attempt to answer these in the context of the Cultural Revolution, Chinaʼs period of violent political upheaval and socialist reform that took place between 1966 and 1976.

English by Wang Gang

The Cultural Revolution also forms the background to English, a semi-autobiographical novel by Wang Gang (2009), situated in Chinaʼs far-western Xinjiang province. The author tells the story of his growing up in Ürümqi, capital of Xinjiang province. At the time of the Cultural Revolution Ürümqi was a “bleak backwater” in the authorʼs own words.

The authorʼs experiences in Ürümqi, a backwater on the periphery of Chinese state, means that the experiences described in English are both particular to Xinjiang as well as general to other Chinese ʻperipheriesʼ. They are particular in that Xinjiang at that time had a tendency to bring certain types of people together – a point that I will come back to later. At the same time, as a reviewer of the book points out, “there might be thousands of ʻLove Liusʼ in other parts of China”. Love Liu is the protagonist of English. Itʼs through his eyes, and the relationships he builds with the people around him – his parent and other adults, his classmates and friends, his teachers and his English teacher in particular – that Wang Gang provides a glimpse at what life was like in China at the time of the Cultural Revolution.

Various reviews, taking a perspectives on these relationships, have been published following the English translation of the book. Particularly noteworthy is Danweiʼs interview with the author. I will instead situate my analysis in a reading of the Cultural Revolution as a biopolitical project of the state.

• Download ‘State power and personal sovereignty‘ as a .pdf document.
• Leader image taken from Baidu Baike.

Since I’ve enrolled into my master programme – Contemporary Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam – I’ve had very little time to post new articles to my blog. Hence this experiment, in which I publish my academic writing to my blog.

Uyghurs in Chinaʼs labour migration

Chinese labour migration, and the emergence of a new division of labour along rural-urban divides, are typically explained in literature with reference to structural components in China’s policy of labour migration. Authors bring to bear the collusion of the state and large industrialists on Chinaʼs eastern seaboard, structural limitations placed on peasants by the situation in the countryside, and the continuation of policies that are often seen as outright discriminatory towards labourers from a rural background, such as the household registration (hukou) system. Others make note of the preference for women labourers in China’s manufacturing industry, and explain such preference with reference to socio-cultural values of ‘knowing ones place’, a patrilocal tradition, and Confucian prescriptions on the social position of women. However, structural components alone cannot sufficiently explain the migratory experience of all China’s temporary labour migrants. This was shown most dramatically last year, when riots between Han and Uyghur communities erupted in Ürümqi. The riots were a direct result from ethnic tensions on the factor floor in China’s manufacturing industry, and were explained with reference to cultural – ethnic and religious – values, especially as they pertain to the proper position of women in the household and their obligations to the religious community. The Uyghur are one of China’s 55 ethnic minorities. They are a people of Turkic descent, most of them are adherents of Islam. There are about 20 million Uyghurs in China and they are most numerous in China’s far-western Xinjiang province.

The ethnic dimension of the migratory experience has received very little attention in the literature on China’s labour migration. Even though minorities face similar structural limitations to the Han on migrating to industrialised urban areas on China’s eastern seaboard, the literature on minority movement suggests that there are also key differences to the rise of an new division of labour in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities. Specifically, Iredale and Fei note that large scale labour migration began at a later date in minority regions compared to areas with Han Chinese peasants, that women are overrepresented in minority migration when compared to Han migration, and that not all 55 minorities have taken part in equal numbers in China’s temporary labour migration. Media account of Uyghurs migration in particular show that targeted recruitment of Uyghur peasants for work in China’s manufacturing industry didn’t get underway until some time after the year 2000. Such ‘labour export programmes’ as they target Han peasant in rural south China go back as far as 1986.

With this paper I aim to contribute to the literature on minority movement and migration, and to theorising about the experience of temporary Uyghur migrants on China’s eastern seaboard. I begin by considering the literature on labour migration in China and Beijing’s policies that perpetuate a rural-urban division of labour. I then turn my attention to the literature on minority migration in general, and to the Uyghur experience in China’s labour migration in particular. Data on Uyghur migration is patchy at best, and anthropological research is restricted to one study among Uyghur migrants in Beijing. Reference to cultural values in the run-up to last year’s riots suggests that the literature on Uyghur identity can bring something to bear on this discussion. I argue that Uyghurs – specifically Uyghur women – enter into complex negotiations between the demands of the state on the one hand and those of their ethnic and religious communities on the other. Whereas the government demands it’s peasant labourers’ cooperation as subjects of the modernising projects of the state, ethnic and religious communities demand appropriate behaviour of its members, and regard them instead as objects of pride. These demands require migrants to creatively submit to regulations for migrant labourers while at the same time maintaining their cultural identity. Taking a clue from such complex negotiations in other situations where Uyghurs also mix with non-Uyghur Chinese, I claim that it’s with reference to ethnic values that Uyghur migrants most easily assert their Uyghur identity.

• Download ‘Subjects of the state or objects of pride?‘ as a .pdf document.

Since I’ve enrolled into my master programme – Contemporary Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam – I’ve had very little time to post new articles to my blog. Hence this experiment, in which I publish my academic writing to my blog.

The politics of integration in Chinaʼs autonomous areas

Global circulation of ideologies, and regional practices associated with these ideologies – an outside-in approach – such is Duaraʼs thesis on Chinaʼs nation-formation. The two above-mentioned quotes summarise these ideas with reference to Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet-state in the first half of the 20th century, in what is now the northeast of China. Traditional scholarship, so the argument goes, judges Japanese imperialism in East Asia by the standard of earlier imperialist ideologies in Europe. The rhetoric of pan- Asianism and the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere functions as a smokescreen for what is essentially a traditional imperialism. But the East Asian context, and associated practices in Japan and East Asia following World War I, belie this simplistic explanation. A new, Japanese imperialism, which Duara coins the ʻimperialism of free nationsʼ, was at the same time characterised by domination and exploitation as well as by development and modernisation. It can therefore only legitimately be explained by a combination of circulating global ideologies and regional practices.

Similarly, it is my contention that Marxist-Leninist ideology alone cannot explain the development of ethnic policy and practices in the Peopleʼs Republic of China. Socialist attitudes towards ʻnationalityʼ and nationalism are typically regarded as forming the foundation of ethnic policy in the PRC. While I donʼt deny the relevance of Marxism- Leninism to the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party, the claim that such ideology alone has shaped the integration of ethnic minorities in the PRC is belied by discrepancies between such ideology and the contemporary situation. I contend that Beijingʼs claims to legitimate control over its autonomous regions are based not only Marxist ideology, but also on ideas and experiences native to China and East Asia. Scholarship on Chinaʼs ethnic policy and Beijingʼs practices of integration in its autonomous areas are needlessly constrained by this narrow, Marxist view and policy analysis. The point I wish to make is that further precedents, such as the Chinese experience with Japanese imperialism, may provide better insights into claims to legitimacy in the autonomous regions of the PRC.

Following on from this point, claims of Chinese colonialism in its peripheral areas – such as Sautmanʼs and Gladneyʼs – are non-sensical if oneʼs interpretation of colonialism is restricted to economic development. The discussion on whether to designate areas such as Xinjiang, Tibet and the Chinese south as internal colonies can only usefully be conducted if Chinaʼs policy in its autonomous areas is considered in its entirety and on its own merits. It is here that the analogy to Japanese expansionism in the first half of the 20th century comes into its own. If Chinese policy is judged only on economic grounds, then our argument becomes a smokescreen for our claims of internal colonialism (or for legitimate rule) with China as the imperial power. As is the case for Japanese expansionist policy in northeastern China, it will be shown that PRC control of its minority areas is characterised by both domination and exploitation as well as by development and modernisation. When we accept that Chinese domination over its autonomous areas is based on more than resource-extraction alone, then perhaps it becomes possible to think of Manchukuo as the beginning of an imperialism that culminates also in the autonomous regions of the PRC.

• Download ‘The global and the regional‘ as a .pdf document.

Since I’ve enrolled into my master programme – Contemporary Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam – I’ve had very little time to post new articles to my blog. Hence this experiment, in which I publish my academic writing to my blog.

“I am a Kashmiri to whom Kashmir has always been the dearest of treasures, and suffered for it. To me the nationalism of today is nothing but a garbled version of the majority-communalism directed towards a definite end.” (Jia Lal Kaul Lalali quoted in Zutshi, 2004: 318).

Salvaging the Kashmiri culture for the inhabitant of the valley has become the prerogative of a number of ideologies. Indian nationalism claims Kashmiriyat as itʼs own, as a perennial example of Indian pluralism, itʼs secular society, where members of all communities used to live side by side in harmony. Pakistanʼs exclusively religious ideology aims to free the valleyʼs majority culture from Indian attempts at drawing Jammu and Kashmir into its sphere of influence, and from the threat of assimilation by Indiaʼs majority Hindu population. Kashmiri nationalists romanticise the valleyʼs past under that banner of Kashmiriyat. Some aim to bring back its culture, citizenship rights for the valleyʼs inhabitants, equality among its various communities, and a degree of self-determination – either within the Indian federation or by secession and independence.

This range interpretations, leading to a variety of mutually exclusive conclusions, has prodded some outside observers to consider Kashmiriyat a hollow ideology. Aggarwal (2008) calls it an empty signifier, a constructed reality, reference to which can only obscure the answers to questions about Kashmirʼs future. Others, among them Zutshi (2004), locate Kashmiriyat in the pre-modern, pre-colonial past of the Kashmir valley. To Zutshi, reference to Kashmiriyat by todayʼs politicians is nothing more than political opportunism, instrumental only as a means to obscure inherently communal or contradictory ideologies. Among other things, contemporary appeals to Kashmiriyat seem to ignore internal differences between the various Islamic communities of the Kashmir valley.

In this essay I intend to trace the history of Kashmiriyat, to locate that oft-quoted identity for Kashmir in the valleyʼs past. With reference to Zutshiʼs account of identity formation in Kashmir, Iʼll attempt to show how its pre-modern regional identity changed to become a rallying call for various modernist causes in the valley. Iʼll show that much of the upheaval and changing relations between communities in the Kashmir valley, at the time of itʼs conversion from a pre-modern society into its contested identity in a modern-day conflict, is to be expected within theories of modernism, Gellnerʼs foremost among these. After itʼs been shown that Kashmiriyat isnʼt merely a constructed concept, but essentially a description of a pre-modern society, Iʼll be in a position to juxtapose this historic concept of Kashmiriyat with the claims of modernist ideologues in the valley around the time of Indiaʼs independence. In the final analysis I will consider the relevance of appeals to regional Kashmiri identities within present-day Jammu and Kashmir. I will thus attempt to answer the question how a regional identity for Kashmir will again be allowed to take root among itʼs violently opposed communities.

• Download ‘An identity for Kashmir‘ as a .pdf document.

Since I’ve enrolled into my master programme – Contemporary Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam – I’ve had very little time to post new articles to my blog. Hence this experiment, in which I publish my academic writing to my blog.

Santa Claus is sad,

what happened to tradition?

Christmas comes early.

The case of Xinjiang, China

The conflict between Han Chinese ʻsettlersʼ and ʻindigenousʼ Uyghur inhabitants of Chinaʼs westernmost province, Xinjiang, is oftentimes explained by the dominance over and suppression of the later by the former; the ruling Han and the oppressed Uyghur. Economic arguments – rural underdevelopment, economic oppression and resource extraction by the Han, and suppression of Uyghur entrepreneurship – hold sway in these accounts of the conflict. The economic argument is heard in the official account of the Chinese government and as a result of the lack of other voices, such as those from people on the ground, the (western) media copy this argument as their explanation of ethnic tensions in Xinjiang. The solution of the Chinese government is the implementation of positively discriminative policies in family planning and education, and introducing quotas on the number of ethnic minority people employed within state-owned enterprises. Yet these policies have failed, as is shown by the violent ethnic clashes in Ürümqi, the capital of Xinjiang province, in July of this year. I contend that the economic argument is just one aspect of the explanation of ethnic tensions in Xinjiang, and that solutions to the conflict should address other aspects as well.

In this paper I intend to identify models, drawn from other areas of inquiry, that can help to highlight other aspects of the explanation of ethnic conflict in western China, such as social, cultural and religious ones. The question that will be addressed in this paper is the following: ʻCan models of identity and development tell us something about the nature of conflict in developmental states, with particular reference to ethnic conflict in Xinjiang, China?ʼ If these alternative domains prove a useful hunting ground for new models of conflict in Xinjiang – and I contend that they are – then they may well be appropriate in other conflict situations as well.

This essay is structured as follows: I will first provide an overview of the literature from which I draw alternative models. In each case I will show the relevance of these models to the study of conflict in Xinjiang, China. I will then apply these models to my case study of ethnic conflict in Xinjiang, drawing extensively from opinion pieces in the popular media by established academics, published with reference to the recent ethnic violence in Ürümqi. In conclusion I will try to generalise my findings on the applicability of models taken from different fields of inquiry.

• Download ‘Models of conflict‘ as a .pdf document.

Since I’ve enrolled into my master programme – Contemporary Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam – I’ve had very little time to post new articles to my blog. Hence this experiment, in which I publish my academic writing to my blog.

How institutional factors foster behaviour in state actors

The Weberian thesis has often been explained as the relevance of motivational factors for the development of the capitalist mode of production. In its traditional form Weberianism stresses the importance of the protestant work ethic in bringing about the industrial revolution in Europe and the subsequent western economic hegemony. Entrepreneurship in the West, in particular in England during the industrial revolution, is explained as behaviour – in the Weberian sense of the word, i.e. as opposed to actions – motivated by a protestant work ethic. Studies of the rise of Asian economies have often focussed on identifying such motivational factors in eastern culture and religion. For an example see Kim and Park (2003), who identify such ʻWeberian virtuesʼ in confucianism as it was recruited by the South Korean political elite in the second half of the 20th century.

Bellah (1968: 55) stresses that institutional factors, such as the political environment and the economic order, play an equally important role in bringing about economic development. Moreover he shows that Weber was aware of the importance of such factors, and claims that the interpretation of the Weberian thesis has often attached greater importance to motivational factors to the detriment of institutions. With regard to motivational factors Bellah agrees with Geertz (1956, quoted in Bellah, 1968: 56) that the protestant ethic isnʼt unique in bringing about a change in the mode of production, but rather that protestantism possesses a certain ʻtransformative capacityʼ that can change the entire value system of society. The protestant reformation serves as a case in point. This transformative capacity, so says Bellah, is a property of religion, not some special feature of protestantism. Hence confucianism has alternatively been employed to explain the failure and the success (see again the case of Kim and Park) of eastern economies. In such cases where economic development has successfully been brought about in the East, confucianism was successfully recruited to bring about a change of the underlying value system.

In this essay I content that not only motivational factors have the ability to bring about behavioural change, but that institutional factors are also important in shaping the behaviour of individual actors. I will use the institutional setting in conjunction with the illegal but licit framework to show how state actors justify their actions. Through personal examples and case studies from literature it will be shown that the institutional framework fosters a sense of entitlement in state actors. If institutional factors also give rise to certain behaviours then it must be concluded that such factors equally posses a transformative capacity.

• Download ‘Entitlement and extortion‘ as a .pdf document.
• Download ‘Entitlement and extortion: presentation‘, a short .pdf presentation on entitlement and extortion.

Since I’ve enrolled into my master programme – Contemporary Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam – I’ve had very little time to post new articles to my blog. Hence this experiment, in which I publish my academic writing to my blog.

Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga or Coxinga) has variously been depicted as a Chinese pirate, an opportunistic general, and a Ming loyalist. Zheng Chenggong was born in a small village near present-day Nagasaki, Japan, to a Chinese father and a Japanese mother. His father oversaw a large trade imperium out of Amoy (present-day Xiamen, in Fujian province, P.R.C.) in the East and South China Seas. With this maritime might came a considerable amount of military power.

In his dealings Zheng Chenggongʼs father had his own agenda and wasnʼt always a loyal subject of the emperor, hence the title of ʻpirateʼ that many later accounts of the history of the Zheng family still carry. After Zheng Chenggong had taken over the family imperium, and the Manchus (Qing dynasty) had overthrown the Ming dynasty, Zheng Chenggong showed great affinity to the Ming cause, earning him the title of Ming loyalist.

Eventually Zhengʼs maritime might wasnʼt sufficient to fend of and overthrow the Qing dynasty in Nanjing. Zheng Chenggong took his army to Taiwan (then Formosa) to continue his cause from the island. In order to settle there the Dutch, who ran a trade concession – Port Zeelandia – near to present-day Tainan, had to be thrown from the island. Zheng Chenggong died on Taiwan, and Formosa was ultimately brought under Qing control.

From this brief summary it may be clear that the story of Zheng Chenggong (anti- imperialist, filial piety, hero or villain) has variously been recruited for nationalist causes in China, Japan and Taiwan. He was also fairly well know in Europe at the time. It is my intentions to trace the nationalist histories of Zheng Chenggong in these four places, and where appropriate highlight the differences between these histories.

• Download ‘Zheng Chenggong‘, as a .pdf document.
• Download ‘Cocksinga – Transcript in Dutch‘, the Dutch transcript (.rtf) of the video.
• Download ‘Cocksinga – Transcript in English‘, the English transcript (.rtf) of the video.

Since I’ve enrolled into my master programme – Contemporary Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam – I’ve had very little time to post new articles to my blog. Hence this experiment, in which I publish my academic writing to my blog.

In focus through process metaphors

“The hegemony of modern geography, mapping, and the geo-body of a nation is far stronger then perhaps we are prepared to realize. It reproduces itself to subsume us under its regime.” (Winichakul, 1994: xi)

It’s been said that modern maps have shaped many areas of discourse. The academic compartmentalisation of Asian Studies into various regions – such as East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia – is but one result of the mapping of the world after World War 2 (Ludden, 2003; Van Schendel, 2002). Maps form pervasive metaphors through which modernist discourse on the nation is continuously perpetuated. As with all metaphors, maps frame discourse in such a way that certain features are highlighted, whereas others are obscured. Van Schendel (2002: 647) calls such features geographies of knowing and geographies of ignorance. An example of such geographies of knowing are the relationships between an area’s – or nation’s, region’s, et cetera – borderland with it’s heartland. Obscured by the map/metaphor, the geographies of ignorance, are the relations between the borderlands of adjacent areas.

Like Nederveen Pieterse (2006: 66-70) I also appreciate the role that metaphors have to play in reshaping regional studies. The appropriate choice of metaphor allows researchers and their audience to draw out different features and ‘jump scale’. I believe that maps as metaphors can be identified with what Van Schendel (2002: 658) calls trait geographies. I intend to show that other metaphors are more appropriately identified with process geographies, and are thus more suitable to the study of flows. In this essay I will (1) identify several such ‘process metaphors’ and (2) contend that, through the pervasiveness of certain such process metaphors, some regions may be more affected than others by the geographies of ignorance that result from map/metaphors.

• Download ‘Geographies of ignorance‘ as a .pdf document.
• Download ‘Trait metaphors and process metaphors‘, a short .pdf presentation on maps as metaphors.

Since I’ve enrolled into my master programme – Contemporary Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam – I’ve had very little time to post new articles to my blog. Hence this experiment, in which I publish my academic writing to my blog.

(Updated 22:30 – False rumours?)

Unrest seems to again have taken hold of the streets in Ürümqi, in western China.

1. Uyghurs announce more violence after 18:00 o’clock on Monday 7 September.
2. The government has ordered businesses to close and people to stay at home.
3. Two bus bombings have allegedly taken place at 17:30 local time on or near 团结路 (Tuanjie street), in what is traditionally seen as ‘the Uyghur part of town’.
4. Two helicopters were seen flying in that direction shortly afterwards.

News accumulates on Twitter in the #Urumqi channel.

False rumours? (added 22:30)

There’s been surprisingly little ‘new news’ of those alleged bus bombings, which makes me question the validity of these (3 and 4) claims.

• Even though it wouldn’t be the first time that busses are targeted by terrorists in Ürümqi…
• … the New Dominion has reported on such spreading of false rumours before.
• See also China threatens punishment for rumors in Urumqi (several other media outlets also run this story).

Town in turmoil

This spate of violence unrest follows protests by Han Chinese, who have been complaining about the government’s response to the rioting that took place in the first week of July.

It’s been alleged that during those recent protests Uyghurs were targeted – several of whom died – in different parts of town. This comes on top of the victims of violence between the police and protesters, which seems to have taken place around 人民广场 (Renmin Guangchang or People’s Square) and 大十字 (Da Shizi).

Nota bene: all times are in Beijing time, which is 8 hours ahead of GMT.