The picture shows Lord Macartney, Embassy to China (1793), a folio taken from “A study of History” by  Arnold Toynbee and available from the Wikimedia Commons.

如果马嘎尔尼的火器操练没被视为奇巧淫技，而是激起清廷官员的忧患与危机

— People's Daily (domestic), 20 December 2010, p.1

This line, taken from a People’s Daily article with the headline “Let reform pull off historic opportunities for us – at the turn of two five-year plans“, translates as follows.

Which is the right translation? This question in trickier than you may think. It is not as simple as failing to pick up on a negation or two.

Sure enough 而且 (moreover, and) warrants the first translation of “and had aroused worries and a sense of crisis” but it also misses the nuance that indicates worries and a sense of crisis are desirablein this context.

Worries and a sense of crisis, in this context, would have encouraged the Chinese to seize and act upon the opportunities available to Qing dynasty officials at the time.

This nuance is carried especially strongly by the word 危机 (crisis), which is a contraction of the characters for danger (危) and opportunity (机).

A syntactically correct translation in English implies that the development of China would have come to a halt if worries and a sense of crisis had been aroused.

But the context assumes that the development of China did come to a halt and that this wouldn’t have been the case if worries and a sense of crisis had been aroused. The latter message is carried more closely, in my opinion, by the syntactically incorrect translation of 而且 (moreover, and).

I welcome your opinions and suggestions, off course.

Connecting the news

The news that “China [is] to fund [the] education of ex-nationals in Gilgit-Baltistan“, in Pakistan, made me think of a “A New Shenzhen: Beijing aims to turn the remote western city of Kashgar into the country’s next big boomtown“, a story that ran a while ago in Newsweek.

If the Chinese government is sincere in its efforts to develop the Kasghar metropolitan area economically; if the government aims to create broad local, national, even international support for such socio-economic development in its Central Asian border region; and if the government hopes to create such support by this latest move to provide education for Uyghur ex-nationals in Pakistan, then I believe this move might prove to be genius.

Big ifs

Off course these are very big ifs – more so in a country like China, where economic and socio-economic development is rarely broadly carried, especially in rural areas.

These ifs will be further compounded by Uyghur suspicions of government intentions in developing the Kasghar economy. Such suspicion will be greater still across the boarder, where the Uyghur community is largely descendant from Uyghur nationalists that left China in the wake of the Kuomintang’s defeat in the mainland and the CCP’s “Liberation of the West”.

The Chinese government may find that there’s even less affinity with Chinese sovereignty over Xinjiang in neighboring diasporic communities then there is in the Uyghur community in Xinjiang, in other words.

Not cynical

But it will do no good to be cynical about these development. I truly hope that the Chinese government is sincere in its effort. For if Kasghar and the broader Central Asian region develops, this area will be all the more interesting for it.

A safaripark

Females
spend their days
foraging
indiscriminately snapping up bargains

Males
speed along
hunting
bringing the rare treat back to the nest

How do people cope? How do different people cope differently with the biopolitical projects of state? These questions are the subject of this paper. I will attempt to answer these in the context of the Cultural Revolution, Chinaʼs period of violent political upheaval and socialist reform that took place between 1966 and 1976.

The Cultural Revolution also forms the background to English, a semi-autobiographical novel by Wang Gang (2009), situated in Chinaʼs far-western Xinjiang province. The author tells the story of his growing up in Ürümqi, capital of Xinjiang province. At the time of the Cultural Revolution Ürümqi was a “bleak backwater” in the authorʼs own words.

The authorʼs experiences in Ürümqi, a backwater on the periphery of Chinese state, means that the experiences described in English are both particular to Xinjiang as well as general to other Chinese ʻperipheriesʼ. They are particular in that Xinjiang at that time had a tendency to bring certain types of people together – a point that I will come back to later. At the same time, as a reviewer of the book points out, “there might be thousands of ʻLove Liusʼ in other parts of China”. Love Liu is the protagonist of English. Itʼs through his eyes, and the relationships he builds with the people around him – his parent and other adults, his classmates and friends, his teachers and his English teacher in particular – that Wang Gang provides a glimpse at what life was like in China at the time of the Cultural Revolution.

Various reviews, taking a perspectives on these relationships, have been published following the English translation of the book. Particularly noteworthy is Danweiʼs interview with the author. I will instead situate my analysis in a reading of the Cultural Revolution as a biopolitical project of the state.

• Download ‘State power and personal sovereignty‘ as a .pdf document.
• Leader image taken from Baidu Baike.

Since I’ve enrolled into my master programme – Contemporary Asian Studies at the University of Amsterdam – I’ve had very little time to post new articles to my blog. Hence this experiment, in which I publish my academic writing to my blog.

Santa Claus is sad,

what happened to tradition?

Christmas comes early.

(Updated 22:30 – False rumours?)

Unrest seems to again have taken hold of the streets in Ürümqi, in western China.

1. Uyghurs announce more violence after 18:00 o’clock on Monday 7 September.
2. The government has ordered businesses to close and people to stay at home.
3. Two bus bombings have allegedly taken place at 17:30 local time on or near 团结路 (Tuanjie street), in what is traditionally seen as ‘the Uyghur part of town’.
4. Two helicopters were seen flying in that direction shortly afterwards.

News accumulates on Twitter in the #Urumqi channel.

False rumours? (added 22:30)

There’s been surprisingly little ‘new news’ of those alleged bus bombings, which makes me question the validity of these (3 and 4) claims.

• Even though it wouldn’t be the first time that busses are targeted by terrorists in Ürümqi…
• … the New Dominion has reported on such spreading of false rumours before.
• See also China threatens punishment for rumors in Urumqi (several other media outlets also run this story).

Town in turmoil

This spate of violence unrest follows protests by Han Chinese, who have been complaining about the government’s response to the rioting that took place in the first week of July.

It’s been alleged that during those recent protests Uyghurs were targeted – several of whom died – in different parts of town. This comes on top of the victims of violence between the police and protesters, which seems to have taken place around 人民广场 (Renmin Guangchang or People’s Square) and 大十字 (Da Shizi).

Nota bene: all times are in Beijing time, which is 8 hours ahead of GMT.

The Chinese aim threats at western journalists. Again the western media comes under criticism in China. Nobody gains from slanted journalism, not the Han, not the Uyghurs, and not the West.

Until late at night on Sunday the 5th of July, when protests broke out in Ürümqi, capital of Xinjiang, the westernmost Chinese province, I was in touch with friends on the scene. Later that night telephone and internet connections to this place of the world were severed. I’ve not heard from my friends and acquaintances since then, and I have to rely on the international media for information from Ürümqi.

The rioting took place between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. The Han are familiar to the media. Last year they organised the Olympics. De Han fell victim to the earthquake in the southern province of Sichuan, and they were the ‘bad guys’ at the time of the Tibetan riots.

The Uyghurs draw less media attention than the Tibetans do, but their situation is comparable. The Uyghurs are one of many ethnic minorities in China but in Xinjiang, their native province, they form that largest ethnic group. Just like the Tibetans, Uyghurs feel their lifestyle and culture are under pressure due to mass migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang.

Since I rely on the international media for information from Ürümqi it strikes me that the media is very ignorant about Chinese policies towards ethnic minorities. I read many inaccuracies in the reporting on the recent protests. Such untruthful journalism fuels anger amongst the Chinese about the West, which doesn’t seem prepared to take China seriously at all.

Take for example the 8-o’clock news on Monday the 6th of July. In an attempt to provide the context of the Ürümqi riots the NOS (Dutch Broadcast Foundation) asserts that frustration among Uyghurs is immense because “Tukish at school is prohibited” and “mosques have been closed down”. Both ‘facts’ are just not true.

In the case of Turkish education the controversy is largely contained within the Uyghur community. The Uyghur language is related to Turkish. Parents are free to decide to send their kids to Uyghur schools. Educated Uyghurs often choose to send their kids to Chinese schools though, because a Chinese education gives you much better career prospects. This situation upsets many traditional Uyghurs.

Visiting a mosque hasn’t been prohibited for several decades. Imams are under surveillance from the state and their education is tightly regulated by the government, but such ideas can be heard in the West as well. There are some exceptions however. Youngsters are prohibited from visiting a mosque, and students and civil servants are likewise prevented from practicing their religion.

In the same week de Volkskrant also didn’t take its journalistic responsibilities very seriously. In their front page article ‘Peking wil van geen leed horen’ they claim that the Chinese government forces Uyghurs into low-paid jobs on the Chinese east coast. It is certainly true that there are policies aimed at finding employment for Uyghurs. It may even be the case that some Uyghurs are ‘forced’ to accept such jobs because of their economic situation. But the government in Beijing forces nobody to make their money in this way. Other ethnic minorities and Han from economic backwaters are equally encouraged to migrate east and find jobs on the prosperous east coast.

A remark in Trouw that “the Chinese government depicts the Uyghurs in the media as dangerous terrorists related to Al-Qaeda” is similarly untrue. The opposite is the case. In an attempt to create a harmonious society, Beijing often depicts ethnic minorities as peaceful, traditional, even cute. Through this approach a lot of tourists are drawn to economically underdeveloped regions. Uyghurs are annoyed at being labelled as ‘cute’ and prefer social and cultural liberties rather then economic investment. The Han find the Uyghurs ungrateful. ‘Strike it rich first, and then we’ll discuss these other issues’, so say the Chinese.

Not all is well about Chinese policies towards ethnic minorities. But out of ignorance or sympathy the western media is too quick to judge ‘powerhouse China’. The Han find this very upsetting; they are annoyed at mistakes in western reporting on China.

This anger shouldn’t be underestimated. In the future China will think twice before it invites western journalists to ‘come and look for themselves’ when problems occur in the restive areas. The West, which would like to gain a foothold with their international human rights, takes a step back instead. And the Uyghurs? If the eye of the international community doesn’t reach into Xinjiang anymore, then they have much more to fear from the Chinese government. It’s in nobody’s interest to slant reporting on the Ürümqi riots. Everyone is better of when facts and opinions are reported as accurately as possible.

This article is a translation of the original ‘Eenzijdige verslaggeving helpt Oeigoeren niet’, which was published in Trouw on Wednesday the 15th of June 2009.

One town

It is hard to image how the army can separate two ethnic groups in a city of approximately 2 million people. The Uyghur neighbourhood is perhaps a little poorer than much of the rest of town. It’s full of Islamic restaurants, small shops, and the Grand Bazaar. Uyghurs are known for their entrepreneurship. ‘When Neal Armstrong set foot on the moon the first person he met was a Uyghur tradesman’. You can hear this anecdote everywhere in China.

But tens of thousands to Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities don’t live in the Uyghur neighbourhood. Ürümqi is a city of traders. Kazakh, Russian, Pakistani, you can hear all of these language in one of the sprawling trade centres dotted around the city. Uyghurs that have climbed to social ladder often take up residence in the rest of town, where apartments are newer and more luxurious. Ürümqi isn’t a city of two neighborhoods that the media makes it out to be; quite the contrary in fact.

Two schools

Uyghur parents have a choice between two types of education: ‘min-kao-min’ and ‘min-kao-han’. ‘Min’ means ethnic minority, ‘han’ is Han-Chinese. ‘Kao’ is Chinese for taking exams. ‘Min-kao-min’ are school where Uyghurs are educated in their own language. At ‘min-kao-han’ schools Uyghurs receive a Chinese education together with Han students. They sit the nationwide exam. Uyghurs that have attended ‘min-kao-han’ school have better career prospects than their ‘min-kao-min’ counterparts, but traditional Uyghurs regard them with some disdain.

* This post will be updated as I hear more news. I’m not in Ürümqi myself so all I write is alleged by friends that I am currently in touch with. // Newswire services have started picking up on the story and the situation seems to have quieted down for now. It’s past midnight in Ürümqi, I won’t continue to post new information here. The New Dominion also has a good digest of information.

Protests and rioting of Uyghurs targetting Hans are taking place in Ürümqi – I speculate that this may also be happening elsewhere in Xinjiang. This is also what I’ve just heard from contacts in Ürümqi. Especially the south of Xinjiang seems to be affected.

I’ve heard from friends that there have been blasts and lots of black smoke in residency compounds. Further news seems to indicate that the army has stepped in. Friends have reportedly heard gunfire.

Riots seems to concentrate on Renmin Guangchang (People’s Square), Zhongshan lu, Nanmen, Erdaoqiao (Jiefang nanlu) and Yan’an lu.

Mobile phone coverage is down in Ürümqi. This has been confirmed by a friend.

(The picture posted here earlier was not from Ürümqi, but from the recent riots in Shaoguan, Guangdong)

There are currently lots of useful media to be found here.

Several videos have leaked out onto the internet. (The latter has been taken down.)

Twitter is a useful tool, news seems to gather in the #urumqi and #xinjiang channels.

Taken from Twitter:

“Urumqi witness: 100s of riot police/soldiers in APCs, trucks, buses have blocked off main streets, rounded up Uighur…”

“Xinjiang” and “Urumqi” forums on Baidu shut down

An internet crackdown seems likely and is allegedly already underway.

Are these planned riots, or did they break out quasi-coincidentally? It’s been alleged that they are related to the recent riots between Han and Uyghur people, and the killing of two Uyghur men, in Guangdong province.

These stories and images put a cryptic message I received about two hours ago in a very different light indeed. My own feeling is that these riots weren’t completely off the cuff but probably picked up momentum as time went by.

See also:

• China’s Xinjiang hit by violence
• People gather in Urumqi, attack passers-by and burn vehicles
• Riots is Urumchi
• Riot strikes China’s Xinjiang region capital
• Violence erupts in China’s Xinjiang region; 2 killed

When I was in Budapest recently the House of Terror both surprised and delighted me. This museum teaches its visitors about 20^th century Hungarian history. Through the many personal accounts that are on display, it provides a place for Hungarians to come to term with the recent past, of fascism and of communism. It perhaps fulfils a role similar to that of the Anne Frank House, and of former Camp Westerbork, in the Netherlands.

I would have liked to take Anthony there. Museums like these are rare in China. If exhibitions talk of recent Chinese history, then they always have ulterior – partisan or nationalistic – motives. It would be good for him to see how other countries deal with atrocities that happened in living memory, and how others come to terms with these parts of their past.

But it was the book of testimonials, a mandatory exercise just after the last displays and just before the shop with museum memorabilia, that caught my attention. As I skipped through the pages I made some observations that I’d like to share with you.

Comments seem to come in three categories, I wonder if this is true for all museums of this kind.

Roughly one in three comments are positive: “the museum is great, the displays are astonishing, and the narratives are moving. I’d recommend this museum to all of my friends.”

Another third of the comments go a little like this: “You’re English is terrible, the captions are completely imconpehrensable. Learn some English first.” (In one instance someone had replied with “Learn Hungarian instead, you idiot.” I concur.)

The last third are the most interesting ones though. These are the visitors’ who think the museum does a commendable job, they are moderately positive, but the exhibition is incomplete in some way.

Such comments go on to explain that part of history which the commentator wants to see under the spotlight. Without fail these commentators explain, possibly without realising it, why they feel this part of history deserves extra attention: “As a communist I think… Since I’m Hungarian I feel… I’m a Jew and therefore…” You get the idea.

It makes me question the motives of these people. Do they go to a museum to learn something, or do they go there just to see their believes and narratives confirmed by the exhibition?

Let’s take an example, a comment that I remember especially vividly. It read something like this:

The histories of those that were so affected by Hungary’s recent page are very moving. But as a Jew I’m shocked to find that this museum pays only lip service to the role of the Hungarian government in the destruction of Hungarian Jews. Instead you seem to put the blame solidly on international and foreign forces.

I would find such a comment very appropriate in the Anne Frank house, where a single narrative provides the context for the rest of the exhibition. The destruction of the Jewish community, that’s one aspect of Hungary’s recent past. But it isn’t the only aspect, and in my opinion a museum with the scope of the House of Terror is right to provide the international context, the rise of fascism after the first world war and Hungary’s subjugation to the Soviet authorities after the second.

That isn’t to say that those people from the Hungarian authorities, who were responsible for those horrible acts, are in any way absolved from the responsibility for their crimes. But surely the House of Terror would have been wrong to mislead its visitors by implying that these things happened in isolation?

Am I right, or is my international context just another narrative screaming for attention, to come to the forefront in the museums of the world, and in the critical analysis of historic facts?

You can judge the English captions for yourself on the House of Terror website. Click through the explanations to each of the rooms one-by-one, start at the top floor room 201 and work your way down.

“I recount my thoughts after leaving the desert. ‘Walking through the wilds freed me from worries and fear, but this is not real freedom. You need money to be free’.”

— Ma Jian, Red Dust

The years I spent in Xinjiang,
my desert;

the situation I find myself in,
my freedom?